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ABSTRACT. The results of comparative surveys have demonstrated great differences 
of perceived life quality. Yet there is doubt whether these differences mean that people 
are really more satisfied in one country than in another. It is generally believed that the 
responses are distorted by factors such as language, familiarity with concepts like satis- 
faction, and social desirability pressures. Though often alleged, the truth of these charges 
has not yet been demonstrated mpirically. 
Ostroot & Snijder (1985) now claim to have demonstrated that about 40% of the 
difference in satisfaction between the French and Americans is due to 'cultural bias': 
in particular to a rosier outlook of the latter. Yet their arguments labor under two 
defects: Firstly, their use of the word 'bias' is misleading. They do not demonstrate 
any discrepancy between avowed satisfaction and 'true' satisfaction. Speaking of a 
'cultural effect' would be more appropriate. Secondly, Ostroot & Snyder do not demon- 
strate that the greater satisfaction of Americans i due to a rosier outlook on their part. 
The data do not allow the conclusion that Americans hold a rosier view than the French, 
nor that such a view is responsible for their greater satisfaction. 
Cross-national studies on perceived quality of life have revealed great differ- 
ences between countries. Americans, for instance, report more satisfaction 
with their lives than the Japanese (Cantril, 1965:184; Gallup, 1976:465) 
and the Danish avow themselves happier than Italians (Inglehart, 1977a: 
153). In Western Europe the difference between countries was even greater 
than the difference in happiness between social categories within the indi- 
vidual countries (Inglehart, 1977b:442). These differences are quite intriguing. 
They suggest hat the main social determinants of happiness are at the macro 
level, rather than at the meso and micro levels where most investigators 
look for them. Yet the differences are regarded with suspicion. It is general- 
ly believed that they are biassed in some way. 
PRESUMED SOURCES OF CULTURAL BIAS 
The literature on cross-cultural comparison of attitudes enumerates various 
potential sources of bias. Three of these have figures in the discussions on 
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the trustworthiness of cross-national differences in ratings of perceived life 
quality: 
Language 
Firstly, seemingly similarly questions may have slightly different connota- 
tions in one language than in another and may thus produce differences in 
response which do not reflect real differences in satisfaction. As yet this 
bias has appeared minimal. In his above-mentioned analysis of West-European 
survey data Inglehart (1977a:154[6) found no differences in the responses 
of Flemish and French speaking Belgians, nor between Swiss respondents of
different tongues. Similarly, Bishen & Atkinson (1980:31) found little 
difference in avowed life satisfaction between French and English speaking 
Canadians. 
Familiarity with the Notion of Subjective Well-Being 
A second source of bias can be a varying familiarity with concepts uch as 
'happiness' and 'satisfaction'. These concepts may be more current in indi- 
vidualistic and hedonistic Western countries than in non-Western ations. 
Responses to questions on this issue might therefore be more positive in 
the former countries than in the latter, non-Western people tending to react 
reservedly to so alien an idea. Elsewhere I have discussed this objection 
(Veenhoven, 1984:143). If it is true we can expect higher non-response rates 
in non-Western countries. I therefore inspected the non-response on ques- 
tions about perceived life quality in the Gallup-Kettering world survey. No 
differences appeared. This lack of difference in non-response on satisfaction 
items is not a question of non-Western respondents being too polite not to 
answer. Questions on other issues sometimes did yield high non-response 
rates in non-Western countries: in fact equally high as in Western ations. 
Social Desirability 
Thirdly, desirability effects may distort the responses. Two such effects have 
been suggested. One is a presumed tendency of the Americans to present 
themselves happier than they really are, American culture demanding cheer- 
fulness. This effect has often been held responsible for the relatively high 
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happiness cores in the U.S. Another desirability effect has been suggested 
by Kenji Iijima (1982:5/6). Trying to account for the relatively low happi- 
ness scores in Japan, he suggests that Japanese society places a premium on 
modesty and conformity. The Japanese would therefore score more frequent- 
ly on the middle categories of rating scales. Neither of these claims has been 
substantiated asyet. 
OSTROOT & SNYDER'S  CLA IM OF  'ROSY-OUTLOOK D ISTORTION'  
Recently Ostroot & Snyder (1985) have contributed to this discussion. 
They claim to have demonstrated that almost half of the differences in per- 
ceived life quality between the French and Americans is due to 'cultural 
bias'. They base their conclusion on a comparison of surveys in an American 
town (Springfield, Illinois) and a comparable town in France (Aix-en-Pro- 
vence). These surveys included identical questions about he satisfaction with 
various domains of life. In line with earlier results Americans reported sig- 
nificantly more satisfaction than the French (0.5 points on a 4-step rating 
scale). Ostroot and Snyder presume that this difference is partly due to a 
greater tendency among the Americans to look through 'rose-colored glasses' 
(p. 245). They try to assess the extent o which this tendency accounts for 
the differences. 
In doing so they started from the assumption that a rosy outlook on one- 
self reveals itself in a rosy outlook on others. They therefore asked their 
French and American respondents how they think people in other countries 
feel about life. Perceived life quality in four countries was rated: in India, 
Mexico, Japan and Sweden. The Americans rated consistently higher: 0.2 
point on a 4-step rating scale. On this basis Ostroot & Snyder conclude that 
40% of the difference in perceived quality of their own life is due to bias: 
0.2 being 40% of the 0.5 difference. 
Does this really prove their point? I don't think so. 
Does 'A ttribu tion of Satisfaction' Indicate a 'Rosy Outlook'? 
Ostroot & Snyder measure the assumed ifference in the rose-colordness of 
of American and French glasses by the degree in which the former attribute 
more satisfaction to people in other countries than the latter. It is true that 
Americans gave somewhat higher levels of satisfaction than the French, but 
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is that difference due to a more pronounced tendency on their part to see 
the sunny side of things? That is possible, but not proven. The data allow 
another explanation as well. 
Suppose that Americans are not more inclined to see things from the 
bright side than the French, but for various other reasons are nevertheless 
more satisfied with their lives. It is then still possible that they expect people 
in other countries to be more satisfied than the French do. Because they are 
happier than the French, they may be more inclined to attribute happiness to 
others. 
Attributional effects of one's own happiness have been demonstrated 
by Goldings (1954:42). He found that 'moderately happy' people tend to 
rate faces on photographs as happy as themselves (complementary projec- 
tion), whereas 'very happy' and 'very unhappy' persons tend to contrast 
projection. If these laboratory observations apply to the survey data at hand, 
they can explain them reasonably well. 
The complementary attributions of the moderately satisfied are likely 
to dominate the scene, both because the moderates represent the bulk of 
the respondents and because the contrast-projections at the extremes tend 
to neutralize ach other in the average scores. The American public consisting 
of more 'moderately' satisfied persons than the French, it is then understand- 
able that Americans attribute more satisfaction to people in other countries. 
ls a Rosy Outlook Responsible for Greater Satisfaction? 
Suppose Ostroot & Snyder are nevertheless correct in their hunch that 
Americans are more inclined to see the sunny side of things than the French, 
is that rosier outlook then responsible for their greater satisfaction? Not neces- 
sarily so. It is equally well possible that Americans are more satisfied for other 
reasons, e.g., because American society fits human needs better than the 
French. The greater satisfaction with their own life can then generalize into a 
greater inclination to see the positive side of everything. In this view the 
prevalence of a rosy outlook is a by-product of a happy culture rather than a 
veil over unhappiness. 
Cultural 'Bias' or Cultural 'Effect'? 
Let us once more suppose that Ostroot & Snyder are right and that the greater 
CULTURAL BIAS 333 
satisfaction of Americans is indeed a result of  their greater inclination to see 
things from the bright side. Is American satisfaction then exposed as 'biased'? 
The use of the word 'bias' is misleading in this context. It suggests a devia- 
tion from some truth: in this case either a deviation from what one 'really 
feels' or a discrepancy with some axiomatic 'standard of  the good life'. Yet 
nothing of  this kind has been demonstrated. Ostroot & Snyder use the term 
'cultural bias' in fact as a generic label for all effects on perceived life quality 
other than the usual socioeconomic ones (p. 241). 
It makes more sense saying that a rosy outlook produces more positive 
perceptions of life, and that a culture that focuses attention on the good 
and the pleasant mostly allows more satisfaction to its members than one 
which preaches uffering and doom. A rosy outlook on life is then a 'cultural 
determinant' of perceived life quality, irrespective of  whether this optimism 
is justified or not. 
CONCLUSION 
Ostroot & Snyder suggest that cross-national differences in ratings of perceived 
life quality are grossly inflated by cultural bias, but fail to prove their point. 
Firstly, they do not prove that Americans look at the world through rosier 
glasses than the French. Their data allow another interpretation as well. 
Secondly, the possibly rosier view of the American is not necessarily 
responsible for the greater satisfaction in the USA. It is equally well possible 
that the former results from the latter. 
Thirdly, even if the greater satisfaction of  Americans is due to their rosier 
outlook, 'bias' is not necessarily involved. Deviation from any 'true' quality 
of life not having been demonstrated, Ostroot & Snyder might do better to 
speak of a 'cultural effect' in this case rather than of 'cultural bias'. 
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